Russian be the language of the Finnish civil service, and it peaked in 1903 when the Governor General was granted dictatorial powers. 4 As Russians rose in rebellion after Bloody Sunday, Finland protested in a manner befitting its political freedoms. Socialists and non-socialists adopted a policy of "passive resistance," which culminated in a five-day general strike and convinced the Tsar to withdraw his Russification policies. offering to form a coalition government in order to achieve the maximum level of independence diplomatically from Russia. 23 The SDP refused due to ideological dogmatism forbidding an alliance with the bourgeoisie, which was partly fuelled by an internal debate that Finland first needed to go through its own bourgeoisie revolution to overthrow the remnants of feudalism in Finland, an event that the SDP intended to wait for. 24 The SDP's refusal to negotiate resulted in the Russian Provisional Government dissolving the Finnish Diet and ordering new elections that were won by the non-socialist parties. 25 At this point the SDP began to recognize the radicalism of the Red Guards. This was the case in Turku when the moderate SDP tried and failed to purge radical Red Guards who were boasting to undertake revolution themselves. 26 The SDP convened an Extraordinary Congress on November 25 th 1917 to deliberate tactics moving forward. 27 The SDP were then split into two main groups -a parliamentary group and a revolutionary group.
The parliamentary group advocated for a de-escalation of violence and the formation of a coalition with the non-socialists, whereas the revolutionary group advocated a seizure of power with Russian support.
Joseph Stalin appeared before this Congress to encourage the Red Guard to rise up against the Finnish government and the SDP leadership, which he claimed attempted to disperse the Red Guard. 28 The SDP decided to continue its parliamentarian tradition, but the Red Guard did not accept this decision and moved ahead with revolution, illustrating their lack of accountability to the SDP leadership. The Red Guards themselves recognized that they would be breaking their own ideological policy and the will of the party if they were to "follow the Upton, Finnish Revolution 1917-18, 254 -255 . 31 Hamalainen, In Time of Storm, [14] [15] allying with the Bolsheviks, they were inserting their cause directly into the Russification narrative that the nationalists were concocting.
The White Finn perception of the events leading up to the Civil War clearly shows how they had begun to see the Red Guard as a Russian entity. This was mostly due to the fact that the Red Guard did not attempt to hide their Russian support. Even before battle lines were drawn, elements of the Red Guard boasted to the Finnish Senate that Russians would fight alongside their Finnish comrades and that weapons were already being supplied from Petrograd. 32 It was very clear in the days leading up to the Red Coup that the socialists were about to vie for power and two key documents outline the White perception of events at the beginning of the Civil War.
The first of those documents is three declarations that were released to the Finnish people, the Smith, Finland and the Russian Revolution 1917-1922, 25 . 33 Sõderhjelm, The Red Insurrection in Finland in 1918, 75 -77 . 34 Smith, Finland and the Russian Revolution 1917-1922, 37 . 35 
